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THE THIRD CIRCUIT WIDENS THE
SCOPE OF SECTION 1983:
ESTATE OF BAILEY v. COUNTY OF YORK
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 18711 provides that
a state or state agent may be held liable in federal court for depriving a
citizen of his civil rights.2 Until 1961' section 1983 was seldom liti-
gated,4 due to the courts' strict construction of the statute.5 Conse-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
2. For an individual to invoke § 1983, he or she must prove that the state has vio-
lated a legitimate constitutional right. Thus, traditional tort concepts will not suffice to
impose liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (false
imprisonment is not a violation of the fourteenth amendment merely because defendant
is a state official); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (more than mere defamation by
state official must be involved to establish a claim under § 1983).
3. In 1961 the Court decided Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe the
Court allowed a cause of action under § 1983 when government employees acted
outside their official authority. See infra notes 5, 22 and accompanying texts.
4. During the period from 1871 to 1920, litigants filed only twenty-one § 1983 suits.
See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Remedy?, 26
IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). In contrast, claimants filed approximately 8,000 § 1983 suits
during the fiscal year 1972. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 287, Table C2. See generally Mc-
Cormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Consti-
tutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1974) (advocating limitations on § 1983
relief due to the increasing volume of § 1983 suits).
5. The courts narrowly construed the requirement that the deprivation of civil
rights be "under color of state law." See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941) (an act is considered "under color of state law" when it involves the "misuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with the authority of state law"): Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1904) (because the act complained of was not only unauthorized, but was
forbidden by the state legislature, it is not considered taken "under color of state law").
Until 1961, courts held that in order for a person to act "under color of state law," the
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quently, the statutory requirements for a section 1983 action remained
unclear.6 During the past two decades, however, the United States
Supreme Court has significantly widened the scope of section 1983, 7
generating much controversy over the statute's application.8 In Estate
act must be within the scope of his official authority. See, ag., Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945) (acts of police officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits or in
violation of established state law are excluded from § 1983 liability). See also supra note
3, infra note 22 and accompanying text.
Courts also narrowly construed the "rights, privileges, and immunities" protected
under § 1983. See Note, Governmental Liability Under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment After Monell, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 66, 69-70 (1978). Specifically, courts
limited the "privileges and immunities" protected under the fourteenth amendment to
rights intimately bound up with the existence of the federal structure. See, e.g., The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873) (the main purpose of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments was to free slaves and protect them from oppres-
sion). Due to the narrow construction of the "privileges and immunities" clause, courts
limited § 1983 suits to cases challenging race discrimination or restrictions on voting
rights. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1133, 1156-69 (1977).
6. The language of § 1983 suggests that a cause of action requires proof of two
elements. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. First, there must be a deprivation
of a right "secured by the Constitution." Second, the deprivation must occur "under
color of state law." See Special Symposium, Section 1983-Introduction, 12 URB.
LAw. 227, 228 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (no particular state of mind on
behalf of a government official is required to invoke § 1983 liability); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (a municipality may not assert the good faith of its
officers as a defense to § 1983 liability); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (section
1983 encompasses claims based purely on statutory violations of federal law); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state officials only entitled to qualified immunity for pur-
poses of § 1983 liability).
8. The differing results reached among federal circuit courts as to when a munici-
pality is liable for its employees' actions illustrates one such conflict. See, e.g., Williams
v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1984) (city that delegated authority to employee held
liable for employee's unconstitutional acts); Rockard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710
F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (court held city liable for the unconstitutional discharge of em-
ployee by supervisors who had final authority on personnel decisions for the city health
and hospitals corporation); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1008 (1982) (court held the city liable for policy that police chief promulgated,
which led to police officer's filing of false charges against complainant); but cf. Bennett
v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (for purposes
of liability under § 1983, the local governing body must have acted unconstitutionally,
or have been directly responsible for policy complained of); Losch v. Borough of
Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1984) (police chief's action in connection with filing
of criminal charges against plaintiff was insufficient to constitute municipal policy for§ 1983 action without municipal regulation or evidence of repeated action by police
chief with regard to filing).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/13
1987] CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATION UNDER SECTION 1983 299
of Bailey v. County of York 9 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
continued the trend of broadening the scope of section 1983, holding a
municipality liable for its failure to adequately investigate an abused
child's home despite the absence of a legal relationship between the
child and the county.' °
York County Children and Youth Services (YCCYS) is a municipal
services agency that provides protection for abused and neglected chil-
dren. YCCYS obtained temporary custody of Aleta Bailey after re-
ceiving a report of child abuse."1 YCCYS returned Aleta to her
mother 2 with minimal investigation into the safety of Aleta's home
environment.13 Aleta died one month later due to physical injuries suf-
fered from child abuse. 4 The administrator of Aleta's estate and
Aleta's father instituted a suit under section 1983.1" They claimed that
YCCYS's failure to properly investigate Aleta's home environment de-
prived Aleta and her father of their constitutional rights.16 Because no
9. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
10. Id. at 511.
11. Id. at 505. A YCCYS employee took Aleta to the hospital, where the examin-
ing physician advised the employee not to return Aleta until her mother's boyfriend left
the house. Id.
12. Id. After the hospital exam, YCCYS told Aleta's mother that it would return
Aleta to her custody if she removed her boyfriend from the home. Id. YCCYS re-
turned Aleta to her mother's home the next day. Id.
13. Id. YCCYS stated that it made periodic visits to Aleta's home following her
return, and ascertained that her mother's boyfriend no longer resided there. Id. at 508.
The court noted this was a factual dispute that needed to be resolved on remand. Id.
14. Id. at 505.
15. Id. The plaintiffs brought a complaint against the county, YCCYS, and Ora
Gruver, the agency's administrator. Id. While the court focused on the municipality's
liability, it noted a recent Supreme Court decision equating an official's actions with
those of the city itself. See id. at 507 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985),
which held that a judgment against a public servant in his official capacity imposes
liability on the entity he represents). The complaint alleged that YCCYS' promulgation
and implementation of "policies and proceures" led to Aleta's death. Id. at 505. The
plaintiffs argued that one of the defective YCCYS policies was the agency's failure to
invoke the procedures of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law, 11 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1984). These provisions provide, inter alia,
(1) a mechanism for the agency's reports and investigations of abuse; (2) judicial deter-
mination of the necessity for protective custody of abused children; and (3) appointment
of a guardian ad 1item for an abused child. See id. §§ 2217, 2208, 2223.
16. 768 F.2d at 505. There was no dispute over the plaintiffs' claim that they had
cognizable constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 509. Aleta
had a liberty interest in being free from physical assault attributed to the state. Id.
(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982), holding that claimant had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
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one in the Bailey household was under state control at the time of
Aleta's death, the district court concluded that section 1983 did not
apply, 7 and dismissed the action.1 8 On appeal, the Third Circuit ruled
that government control or custody is not a prerequisite for municipal
liability under section 1983 and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 19
Enacted to combat Ku Klux Klan activities during the Reconstruc-
tion Era,2° section 1983 was to provide a measure of federal control
over southern state officials reluctant to enforce the civil rights of
newly freed slaves and union sympathizers.21 Municipalities, however,
cess clause to be free from bodily restraint); Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir.
1984) (prisoner had constitutionally protected right to be free from physical assault by
another inmate).
Aleta's father had a liberty interest in guarding the life and physical safety of Aleta
against deprivations caused by state action. This right derives from the parent-child
relationship. See 768 F.2d at 509 (citing Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1209(7th Cir. 1984), in which father had constitutionally protected liberty interest in contin-
ued association with his son and could recover under § 1983 for police causing his son's
death); but cf. Jackson v. Marsh, 551 F. Supp. 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (parents had no
constitutionally protected right to the companionship, care, custody, support, and pro-
tection of their children under § 1983).
17. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 580 F. Supp. 794 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
18. Id. at 797. YCCYS had no legal control or custody of Aleta at the time of her
death. Id.
19. 768 F.2d at 511.
20. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 804-06 (1871). Section 1983 is
modeled after § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but differs in two important respects:
"(1) it provides a civil remedy; and (2) it covers "all deprivations of rights under color
of law, not just those based on race." See Walter, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the State
Action Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 3, 18 (1985).
In recent years, Congress has unsuccessfully attempted to amend the statute. See
Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 1983: Hearings on S. 585 and S. 990 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. 462 (1981). Senator Hatch introduced two amendments in the 97th Congress
designed to narrow the scope of § 1983. Id. The first amendment afforded a good faith
immunity defense to government entities in actions brought under § 1983, thereby over-
ruling Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Id. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text. The second amendment proposed that "and laws" be changed byinserting "and by any law providing for equal rights of citizens or all persons within thejurisdiction of the United States." See 127 CONG. REc. 31,628 (1981). This amend-
ment sought to overrule Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See generally Black
Sagafi-Nejad, Proposed Amendments to Section 1983 Introduced in the Senate, 27 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 373, 388-89 (1983) (author notes that the widening scope of§ 1983 has ledCongress to try to narrow the statute's application, but advocates continuing the broad-
ening trend).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
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remained immune under the statute2 2 until the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services.23 In Mo-
nell the city's official policy compelled pregnant employees to take un-
paid leaves of absence if such leaves were taken before medically
required.2 4 The Court concluded that section 1983's legislative history
indicated Congress' intent to subject municipalities as well as officials
to the statute. 25 The Court, however, extended liability to municipali-
ties only when an official custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or deci-
22. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Monroe Court concluded that
Congress did not intend "person," as used in § 1983, to apply to municipalities. Id. at
190. The Court predicated its reasoning on Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amend-
ment. Id. at 187-90. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
As a result of the municipal immunity granted in Monroe, civil rights claimants based
their causes of action directly on violations of the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (plaintiff allowed to seek damages against
federal officials directly under the fourth amendment). See generally Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1975) (discusses Bivens method of imposing liability on municipality directly under
the fourteenth amendment).
23. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell the court upheld Monroe, however, only to the
extent "that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for rendering municipali-
ties liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees." Id. at 663.
24. Id. at 661. The city admitted that the policy existed, but stated the policy
changed after the plaintiffs instituted suit. Id. at 661 n.2.
25. Id. at 690-91. Specifically, the Court shifted its interpretation of Congress' re-
jection of the Sherman Amendment to the original Ku Klux Klan Act. Id. In its initial
form, the amendment made any inhabitant of a municipality liable for damage inflicted
by persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled." See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 761 (1871). Senator Sherman explained that the purpose of the amendment
was to enlist the aid of property owners in the enforcement of civil rights laws by mak-
ing their property responsible for Ku Klux Klan damage. 436 U.S. at 667 n.16 (re-
marks of Sen. Sherman). Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment. The Court in
Monroe felt this rejection indicated Congress' intent that municipalities remain immune
under § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190 (1961). See generally Levin, The
Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1492-94 (1977) (advo-
cates a qualified immunity standard for municipalities).
In Monell, however, the Court reasoned that if Congress did not want § 1983 to apply
to local governments, it would not have specifically imposed liability on state or local
officials, 436 U.S. 658, 660 (1978). The Court also examined case law as it existed in
1871 and concluded that Congress, aware of this case law, intended "persons" to apply
to municipalities. Id. at 688-89 (citing Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121
(1869), which held that a municipal corporation is deemed to be a person capable of
being treated as a citizen as much as a natural person). Finally, the Court noted other
acts passed in 1871 that explicitly equated the word "person" with corporate bodies.
See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978) (the word "per-
son" may extend and be applied to "bodies politic and corporate").
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sion injured an individual's constitutional rights.26
After Monell, litigation focused on the issue of what activities, par-
ticipated in by which officials, constituted official policy for purposes of
section 1983 liability.27 In appropriate circumstances, federal courts
inferred official policies from the absence of formal agency conduct or
regulations.28 Such cases generally based liability on two findings:
26. 436 U.S. at 694. The Court gave the following guidelines on deciphering official
governmental policy: (a) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by government officers, id. at 690; (b) an action or policy that
has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels,
id. at 691; (c) an action or a policy made by its law makers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, id. at 694. See generally Payment,
Civil Rights Liability of Municipalities in the Wake of Monell, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 562, 564(1981) (discusses the various possible interpretations of "government policy" for § 1983
suits).
27. See Kramer, Section 1983 and Municipal Liability: Selected Issues Two Years
After Monell v. Department of Social Services, 12 URB. LAW. 232, 241 (1980). While
Monell provided some guidance to lower federal courts applying § 1983, confusion ex-
isted among lower courts as to what constitutes "official policy." See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
Although an isolated act on the part of one employee is usually insufficient to estab-
lish official city policy, courts have held that the official city policy requirement is met
when the police department fails to take disciplinary measures against an officer who
acts unconstitutionally. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981)(policeman was acting "under color of state law" when municipality did nothing to curb
his behavior after several citizens filed complaints).
The Supreme Court implied that a single action of a high-ranking official may repre-
sent official policy. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 367 (1976) (determining govern-
ment policy turns on degree to which state agent participated in pattern of violation by
virtue of knowledge, acquiescence, support, and encouragement). See generally
Freilich, 1978-79 Annual Review of Local Government Law: Undermining Municipal
and State Initiative in an Era of Crisis and Uncertainty, 11 URB. LAw. 547, 550 (1979)(notes confusion inherent in determining "government policy" for purposes of imposing
liability under § 1983).
28. See, e.g., Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1985) (court inferred a munici-
pal custom condoning police misconduct due to a series of incidents resulting from the
city's failure to set procedures for arrest); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th
Cir. 1981) (municipality liable for injury caused by police or custom made by its
lawmakers even though custom had not received formal approval through official deci-
sion-making channels).
Congressional debates during the passage of § 1983 also indicate that Congress in-
tended the statute to encompass acts of omission. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 78 (remarks of Rep. Perry), 429 (remarks of Rep. Beatly), 448 (remarks of Rep.
Butler), 114 (remarks of Sen. Farnsworth), 251 (remarks of Sen. Morton). These de-
bates reveal that Congress' primary purpose for enacting § 1983 was to force southern
officials to actively protect the civil rights of newly freed slaves. See id. at 604, 608(remarks of Sen. Poole). Southern states were criticized for failing or neglecting to curb
Ku Klux Klan activities. See id. at 338 (remarks of Rep. Witthorne), 368 (remarks of
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first, the absence of formal agency conduct or regulation was a substan-
tial factor leading to the denial of a constitutionally protected right,29
and second, the officials in charge of the agency displayed a mental
state of "deliberate indifference." '
Post-Monell decisions imposing liability on municipalities for their
failure to act 3 focused on the complex issue of whether a municipality
owes an affirmative duty to protect its citizens from constitutional vio-
lations.32 In Martinez v. California 33 the Supreme Court found that an
Rep. Sheldon). See generally Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 213, 229 (1979) (advocates an interpretation of § 1983 that covers all
acts of omission which lead to the deprivation of citizens' constitutional rights).
29. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (there must, at
the very least, be an affirmative link between municipality's policy and particular consti-
tutional violation alleged).
30. See, eg., Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984) (to impose § 1983
liability on municipality, a prisoner must show intentional, deliberate, or reckless indif-
ference to his safety by prison officials); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979)
(premeditated nature of prison beating, and the number and rank of officers involved,
indicated deliberate indifference by county to violence of prison officials).
31. Actually, a pre-Monell decision, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), is
credited with propelling the debate on whether an affirmative duty to protect exists.
Not until the Supreme Court decided Monell, however, did federal courts begin to di-
rectly discuss the affirmative duty issue. See Note, Municipal Liability Under 1983:
The Meaning of "Policy or Custom, " 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 305 (1979).
32. Confusion arises in this context over the differences between causation and duty.
Causation concerns the connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
injury. Duty, on the other hand, focuses on whether the defendant owes any obligation
to protect the plaintiff from the threatened harm. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 42, at 274-75 (5th ed. 1984).
Courts addressing constitutional torts issues based on § 1983 often blur the distinc-
tion between causation and duty, resolving the threshold duty question in terms of cau-
sation. See, e.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) (court held that
supervisory officials "caused" physical assault committed by individual officers, but
court was actually concerned with whether the defendants were under any obligation to
prevent the harm). See generally Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 443, 478-79 (1982) (advocates clearer line-drawing by courts between duty and
causation questions).
The label "constitutional tort" given to § 1983 actions is attributed to Marshall
Shapo. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 323-24 (1965). Shapo defines a constitutional tort as "not quite a
private tort, yet [it] contains tort elements; it is not 'constitutional law,' but employs a
constitutional test." Id. at 324.
Causation and duty questions, of course, emerge only when claimants assert that a
municipality was negligent. See W. PROSSER, supra, § 42, at 274. Municipal policy
may serve as the basis for negligence if it is so severe or long-standing as to demonstrate
city policy-making officials' deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text. See also Glannon, Recovery for Civil Rights Vio-
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affirmative duty to protect may exist provided there is a special rela-
tionship between the municipality and the claimant.3 4
In Martinez a parolee murdered the plaintiffs' decedent five months
after the state released the parolee. 35 The Court reasoned that absent
some special relationship between the state and the decedent, section
1983 did not apply because the government no longer controlled the
parolee.3 6 The Court, however, offered no specific guidelines as to
what constitutes a special relationship.37 Rather, the Court stated that
"the parole board was not aware that the plaintiffs' decedent, as distin-
guished from the public at large, faced any special danger," and dis-
missed the suit on proximate cause grounds.38 Martinez thus left open
the possibility that in another setting a right of affirmative protection
might prevail.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to resolve the ques-
tion Martinez left open in Doe v. New York City Department of Social
Services.39 In Doe two victims of sexual abuse filed a section 1983 suit
against the city. They alleged that a child services agency violated an
affirmative duty to protect them when it failed to inspect and recertify
lations in Massachusetts: A Comparison of Section 1983 with State Tort Remedies, 18
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 247, 290-93 (1984) (discusses the elements of a § 1983 claim
against municipal supervisors for negligent conduct).
33. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
34. Id. at 285. Although the Martinez Court never articulated what constitutes a
special relationship, it noted that the murderer-parolee was "in no sense an agent of the
parole board." Id. The parolee's action five months after his release, therefore, cannot
be characterized as state action. Id. "Also, the parole board was not aware that the
[plaintiff's] decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special dan-
ger." Id.
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id. at 285.
37. Id. The court merely stated that the parolee was not an agent of the state and
Martinez, the victim, was not connected to the state in any way. Id. See supra note 34
and accompanying text.
38. 444 U.S. at 285. Perhaps the Court's unstated reason for referring to the re-
moteness of the consequences is the view that the government is responsible only for
events "that it either intended or reasonably should have anticipated." In other words,
the Court felt the municipality owed no duty to the plaintiff's decedent. See Terrell,
"Property, " "Due Process, " and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal
Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861, 920 (1982). See also supra note 32 and accompanying text(noting the distinction between causation and duty and courts' frequent confusion over
that distinction).
39. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the foster home to which the city had assigned them.' The court ruled
the city had an affirmative duty to protect, 4 ' but only in cases in which
the individual was under government custody or control.42
One year later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed Doe's
recognition of an affirmative duty to protect in Bowers . De Vtoi4 3 In
Bowers a state mental hospital released a schizophrenic with a history
of criminal violence who subsequently murdered the plaintiff's dece-
dent.44 Bowers' estate filed a section 1983 suit against the hospital,
claiming the state had reason to know the danger presented by dis-
charging its former patient.45 According to the court, no affirmative
duty of protection exists unless the state takes an active role in placing
an individual in danger.46 Because the state never affirmatively placed
40. Id. at 137.
41. Id. at 143-45. While the court did not explicitly state the degree of culpability
necessary to impose an affirmative duty to protect, it did suggest that the defendant's
conduct should reveal "deliberate indifference." Id. at 145. See supra note 30 and ac-
companying text. In Doe the plaintiffs did not need to show that the agency had specific
knowledge of their mistreatment in their foster home. 649 F.2d at 145. The court
imposed liability on the basis of the agency's deliberate indifference in the face of what
officials should have known. Id. See generally Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional
Tort Under Section 1983: The State of Mind Requirement, 46 CIN. L. REv. 45, 50-53
(1977) (advocates flexible state of mind requirement for purposes of holding municipali-
ties liable for negligence under § 1983). But cf. Comment, Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court Finds New Ways to Limit Section 1983, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 776, 778-79 (criticizes
trend in cases holding that § 1983 claimants need not prove that defendants "willfully"
or "with specific knowledge intentionally" violated their constitutional rights).
42. 649 F.2d at 141. The facts in Doe indicated that the agency retained supervisory
control over the plaintiffs while in their foster home. But cf. White v. Rochford, 592
F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (police held liable under § 1983 for infringing on children's
constitutional rights by abandoning them, despite having no physical or legal control
over them).
43. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 617. The schizophrenic murdered the plaintiff's decedent one year after
release from the state mental hospital.
45. Id. The facts indicated that the state had released the patient several years ear-
lier and he killed someone at that time. Id. Afterwards, the state committed the patient
again to the mental hospital and released him before Bowers' death. Id.
46. Id. at 618. The court noted that the state merely failed to adequately protect
Bowers, as a member of the general public, from a dangerous madman. Id. While
Bowers never explicitly referred to the "special relationship" rationale advocated in
Martinez, the court implied that an affirmative duty to protect may arise in cases in
which the claimant was under government custody and control. Id. See supra text
accompanying notes 31-36 for a discussion of Martinez. Specifically, the court recog-
nized that state prison personnel are sometimes liable under § 1983 for their failure to
protect inmates. See 686 F.2d at 618 (citing Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2 554, 557 (7th Cir.
1974), which held prison officials liable under § 1983 for neglecting to stop a beating of
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Bowers in danger, the court dismissed the plaintiff's section 1983
action.47
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the affirmative pro-
tection issue in Jensen v. Conrad.48 In Jensen the administratrix of a
child's estate brought a section 1983 suit against a child services agency
for failing to protect the child from her abusive parents.49 The court
one prison inmate by another). In Bowers, however, the state retained an informal rela-
tionship with the patient after his release. Id. at 619. At the time of Bowers' death, the
patient returned to the mental hospital periodically for medication and counseling. Id.
The majority opinion in Bowers prompted a dissent. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that Martinez applied, but felt that a relationship existed between the
hospital and the mental patient. Id. at 620. The dissent also questioned whether knowl-
edge of a special danger to a particular person in parole cases was relevant in mental
cases. Id.
47. Id. at 618.
48. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984). While Jensen was at the appellate stage, the
Fourth Circuit decided another case on the issue of an affirmative duty to protect. See
Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983). In Fox a parolee seriously injured three
women. The women brought a § 1983 suit against the parole board, alleging that the
parole officers failed to adequately supervise the parolee. Id. at 86. The court, however,
never discussed the "special relationship" problem extensively. Id. at 87. Rather, the
court explicitly followed Martinez and held that because the claimants were simply
members of the public at large with no special relationship with the state, they had no
constitutional right to state protection. Id. at 88.
49. 747 F.2d at 187. The complaint alleged that the agency failed to supervise the
Browns' home while the abused child was under the agency's care and that, conse-
quently, the child's parents beat her to death. Id. at 188.
Over the past few years, child services agencies have become particularly susceptible
to § 1983 suits based on acts of omission. See Liability of Child-Serving Agencies, 3
CHILD LEGAL RIGHTS J. 4, 17 (1981). Typically, claimants allege that an agency or
agency official failed to follow a state's child protection statute and as a result of this
negligence, a child suffered physical harm or death. Id. at 4.
The increasing amount of attention paid to the legal responsibilities of child services
agencies is a result of changes in the law recognizing childrens' constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(school children are "persons under the Constitution," and as such are entitled to con-
stitutional rights consistent with the legitimate requirements of their educational institu-
tions); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(children as well as adults have a constitutionally protected right to privacy). See gener-
ally C. RosE, SOME EMERGING ISSUES IN THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF CHILDREN'S
AGENCIES 3-5 (1978) (advocates balance between protecting childrens' constitutional
rights and allowing child services agencies to use their discretion without fear of legal
liability).
Recent government reports reveal the threat felt by the child services industry due to
the increasing number of lawsuits filed against them. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT LITIGATION: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES (1981) (recognizing the
more active role courts play in child protection cases, the author recommends a frame-
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considered various factors to determine the existence of a special rela-
tionship."0 First, the court concentrated on whether the victim or the
perpetrator was in the legal custody of the state at the time of the inci-
dent, or had been in the state's legal custody prior to the incident.5 '
Second, the court questioned whether the state expressly stated its de-
sire to provide affirmative protection to a particular class or specific
individuals.52 Last, the court focused on whether the state knew of the
claimant's plight.53 After delineating these special relationship guide-
lines, however, the court declined to rule on whether such a relation-
ship existed in Jensen.54
In Estate of Bailey v. County of York 55 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit began its opinion with a synopsis of what constitutes
government policy or custom for purposes of municipal liability under
work for judges to follow when litigating child abuse issues); NATIONAL CENTER ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD
PROTECTION: PROVIDING ONGOING SERVICES (1980) (provides guidelines for social
workers to follow in child abuse cases in an effort to curb legal liability faced by child
services agencies).
50. 747 F.2d at 194-95 n.11.
51. Id. at 194 n. 11. The court found Martinez controlling. Id. Thus, when the
state is unaware that the claimant, as opposed to a member of the public at large, faces a
special danger, § 1983 liability does not apply. Id. Also, the court indicated that the
lack of a past or present custodial relationship between the state and the perpetrators
precludes the finding of a special relationship. Id.
52. Id. at 195 n. 11. The court implied that a municipality must explicitly state its
desire to offer protection to an ascertainable class before a claimant may invoke § 1983.
Id.
53. Id. This factor addressed the "extent to which the state intended to protect or
watch over the particular claimant involved." Id. Thus, if the state actually knew that
the parents were beating a former child-patient, a special relationship is present. Id.
Implicit in this third factor is the court's concern with the foreseeable plaintiff. Id.
Although Jensen never frames its reasoning in terms of foreseeability, the court implies
that a claimant must show that the municipality could reasonably foresee the particular
injury suffered before the court will recognize an affirmative duty to protect. Id. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 32, § 42, at 275 for a general discussion on foreseeability in negli-
gence claims.
54. 747 F.2d at 195. Instead, the court held that the defendants were entitled to a
good faith immunity defense against § 1983 liability. Id. Although Jensen never offered
explicit reasons for granting qualified immunity to agency officials, the court noted that
the employees "could not have known" that a failure to protect the decedents would
lead to a violation of their constitutional rights. Id. The court stated, however, that
without the foreseeability problem, a right of affirmative protection arising out of a
special relationship might exist in Jensen. Id.
55. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
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section 1983.6 After emphasizing prior cases that inferred government
policy from omissions to act,57 the court questioned whether section
1983 includes an affirmative duty to protect.58 The court acknowl-
edged the special relationship rationale advocated in Martinez,59 but
noted that no consensus existed among the federal courts regarding the
parameters of that relationship.6" Absent defined limits, the court rea-
soned that a special relationship could exist with or without state cus-
tody or control.61 The Bailey court held that YCCYS owed Aleta an
affirmative duty to protect under section 1983 even though she was
never in the agency's legal custody.62 The court narrowed its decision,
however, by refusing to extend its holding beyond the special circum-
stances present in Bailey.63
56. Id. at 506-08.
57. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The court noted that the plain-
tiffs must prove that YCCYS' failure to monitor Aleta's home resulted in the depriva-
tion of her constitutional rights and that the officials in charge displayed a mental state
of deliberate indifference. 768 F.2d at 509. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58. 768 F.2d at 509-11. The court focused specifically on whether the facts indi-
cated that YCCYS owed a duty to Aleta. Id. at 509. It noted that YCCYS knew Aleta
was an abused child, took her into temporary custody, and returned her without ade-
quately investigating her home environment. Id. at 510.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5 10-11. The court cited dicta from various cases that implied a custodial
relationship was not required in order to find an affirmative duty to protect. Id. For
instance, the court noted that Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527(D. Conn. 1984), held that police officers are under an affirmative duty to protect all
people in the community, even without any custodial relationship. Bailey also inter-
preted language in Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982), that implied a right
of affirmative protection could arise under the fourteenth amendment, provided some
relationship, not necessarily custodial, existed. 768 F.2d at 510.
61. Id. at 511. The court noted that YCCYS knew that Aleta faced a special danger
from her home environment. Id. According to the court, this danger was sufficient to
establish a special relationship. Id. at 510-11.
62. Id. at 511. At least one commentator implicitly supports Bailey's expansion of
the affirmative duty doctrine. See Note, supra note 31, at 313 (the legislative history of§ 1983 shows the statute imposes on states a duty of protection which applies to all
citizens). But cf. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50
IND. L.J. 5, 32 (1974) (concern with an overly broad application of § 1983 requires that
limitations be placed on statute); Comment, Strict Liability Under Section 1983 for Mu-
nicipal Deprivations of Federal Rights? 55 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 153, 163-66 (1980) (opts
for adopting traditional negligence standards for § 1983 liability because claimants are
able to recover without proving that the state's conduct was responsible for their harm).
See generally Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 5, 30-40 (1980) (dis-
cusses the relationship between constitutional torts and common law torts).
63. 768 F.2d at 511. The court never defined the exact circumstances it relied on
for its holding, but implied that YCCYS should have foreseen that Aleta was in special
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Justice Adams offered a strong dissent, 64 premised on his belief that
Martinez was controlling. 65 After outlining the causation problems in-
volved in Bailey,6 6 Justice Adams relied on Martinez to show that even
if YCCYS owed a duty to Aleta, its inaction did not deprive her of any
constitutional rights.67 The dissent then criticized the majority's infer-
ence of a special relationship between YCCYS and Aleta when none
existed. 68 Justice Adams concluded that because the majority had ex-
tended the statute beyond that which Congress intended, it ignored the
purpose of section 1983.69
The importance of the Third Circuit's decision in Bailey is particu-
larly pronounced when compared to past cases addressing the "special
relationship" issue.7" Martinez and later federal court opinions7 1 lim-
ited municipal liability under section 1983 when a claimant's injuries
seemed too far removed from government conduct.72 Rather than dis-
miss a claimant's action on purely causation or foreseeability grounds,
however, these cases established a legal or custodial relationship re-
danger. Id. at 510. The court noted that YCCYS received a specific confirmation of
child abuse from the examining physician and knew the individuals who beat her. Id.
64. Id. at 511 (Adams, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 512. The dissent argued that questions of causation under § 1983 do not
turn on whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff or proximately caused the
injury. Id. Rather, the dissent felt issues of causation should be resolved with reference
to the policies and values pertinent to § 1983, as opposed to common law tort concepts.
Id. The dissent, however, offered no guidelines as to what policies and values were
pertinent to § 1983. Id.
67. Id. at 513. Justice Adams stressed that Aleta's death occurred five months after
YCCYS returned her home and that her life was taken by persons who were not under
state control. Id. These factors, he concluded, indicated that Aleta's death was a conse-
quence too remote from the agency's actions to hold YCCYS responsible under § 1983.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Justice Adams emphasized that Congress enacted § 1983 primarily to re-
dress state officials' acts of discrimination. Id. The majority opinion, the dissent ar-
gued, transgressed the original purpose of § 1983 by creating, in effect, a national state
tort claims act administered in the federal courts. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54 (discusses the various cases addressing
the affirmative duty to protect issue under § 1983).
71. See cases cited supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
72. Id. For instance, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the parolee
murdered the plaintiff's decedent five months after the state released the parolee. Id. at
279. In Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982), the decedent was killed by the
former mental patient one year following the patient's release. Id. at 617.
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quirement.73 Bailey modifies this special relationship rationale through
its conclusion that municipal custody or control is no longer necessary
to establish an affirmative duty to protect.74 With its removal of the
government control or custody requirement, however, Bailey offers no
clear guidelines to delineate a special relationship on other grounds,
such as foreseeability or causation. 75
The Third Circuit's failure to decide Bailey on clear alternate
grounds warrants criticism because the court's holding casts doubt on
the vitality of the special relationship rationale.76 In Martinez the
Supreme Court placed certain limits on municipal liability for negli-
gence under section 1983. 77 Bailey's willingness to relax those limits
without offering alternative tests allows claimants to pursue successful
section 1983 negligence actions that are otherwise inadmissible under
traditional tort standards.7' Taken to its extreme application, Bailey's
holding could turn section 1983 into a national tort claims act,79 open-
ing the floodgates to frivolous negligence suits.80 Congress never in-
tended for section 1983 relief to stretch that far.81
The result in Bailey also threatens the discretion and flexibility of
73. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54. The custodial relationship require-
ment, however, is essentially predicated on the foreseeable plaintiff rationale in common
law tort actions. See supra notes 32, 53 and accompanying text (discusses the causation
and duty distinction as it relates to the foreseeable plaintiff issue).
74. 768 F.2d at 511. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.
75. 768 F.2d at 511.
76. See supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text. Importantly, the court never
completely rejected the special relationship requirement advocated in Martinez. Rather,
the court felt a special relationship exists in Bailey because the agency was aware of
Aleta's condition and knew that she faced a special danger in her home environment.
768 F.2d at 510-11. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discusses the special relationship
requirement advocated in Martinez).
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For a general discussion on the rela-
tionship between constitutional and common law torts, see Whitman, supra note 62, at
30-40.
79. Justice Adams feared that the court's holding would create a national tort
claims act. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80. Many commentators fear that allowing § 1983 claimants to invoke the statute
without meeting traditional prima facie negligence standards will overload the courts
and stretch the Act far beyond what Congress intended. See supra note 62 and accom-
panying text.
81. Recent congressional amendments narrowing the accessibility to § 1983 suits
show the government's concern with the statute's widening scope. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
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municipal services agecies.82 In Bailey the court allowed the plaintiffs
to successfully assert section 1983 liability against a municipal child
abuse center when the agency no longer had legal custody of the
abused child." The court's holding thus provides an impetus for fu-
ture litigants to successfully sue children's agencies for abuse-related
deaths over which the agencies have no physical or legal control.84
Trapped between the threat of lawsuits for failing to intervene and law-
suits claiming negligent interventions, child services agencies might
find it difficult to effectively exercise their discretion.85 Bailey's con-
cern was to protect children from child abuse.86 Ironically, the court's
holding may lead to adverse consequences far removed from that goal.
Jennifer L. Weed
82. Agencies already exhibit an increasing fear of § 1983 liability in the wake of
Monell. See C. ROSE, supra note 49, at 2 (discusses the effect of the expanding number
of § 1983 suits on child service agencies).
83. 768 F.2d at 511. If YCCYS never actually investigated Aleta's home before
returning her, then perhaps the claimants would have had a strong argument for impos-
ing liability. As noted before, however, whether YCCYS investigated Aleta's home was
a factual dispute to be resolved on remand. Id. at 508. See supra note 13 and accompa-
nying text.
84. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discusses the increasing volume of
§ 1983 suits filed against child services agencies and the threat felt by these agencies due
to this heightened litigation).
85. While the threat of lawsuits, arguably, may make municipal agencies more cau-
tious, inter-agency articles reveal that agencies are becoming more afraid to intervene in
delicate situations, such as cases involving child abuse. See Liability of Child-Serving
Agencies, supra note 49, at 5.
86. 768 F.2d at 510.
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